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We argue that the rationalization gains often predicted by static applied general equilibrium models with
imperfect competition and scale economies are artiﬂcially boosted by an unrealistic treatment of ﬂxed
costs. We introduce sunk costs into one such model calibrated with real-world data. We show how this
changes the oligopoly game in a way signiﬂcant enough to aﬁect, both qualitatively and quantitatively,
the outcome of a trade liberalization exercise.
Any views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.1. Introduction*
In the past decade, many traditional trade policy issues have been reformulated in terms
of oligopoly models with increasing returns to scale borrowed from the industrial organiza-
tion literature. An exciting portion of this research program aims to quantify and test the
empirical relevance of some of the propositions of the new trade theory using numerical gen-
eral equilibrium (GE) models calibrated with real-world data. Since Harris’ (1984) seminal
contribution, applied GE models with imperfect competition and scale economies have been
extensively used, particularly to study trade liberalization issues.1 The role these models
have played in the recent debates on the Canada-U.S. free-trade agreement, the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the European Single Market demonstrates their
potential importance for policy analysis.
Previous applied GE modeling eﬁorts, however, follow Harris in making the Cham-
berlinian assumption of costless entry and exit of ﬂrms into and out of an industry. This
hypothesis is not particularly appealing. The importance of sunk costs in the shaping of
market organization has long been investigated in the industrial organization literature.
* The authors are most grateful to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments that have
led to signiﬂcant improvements in the paper. They also thank Rick Harris, Bill Schworm, and seminar
participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for useful discussions and Antoine Pradayrol for
computational assistance. Mercenier gratefully acknowledges hospitality from the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis and ﬂnancial support from the FCAR of the Government of Quebec and the SSHRC of
the Government of Canada. Schmitt acknowledges hospitality from CERGE-EI, Charles University, and
ﬂnancial support from the Swiss National Fund for Scientiﬂc Research. Any views expressed here are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve
System.
1 See, for example, Cox and Harris (1985), Wigle (1988), Brown and Stern (1989), Markusen and Wigle
(1989), Devarajan and Rodrik (1991), Gasiorek et al. (1992), de Melo and Roland-Holst (1994), Markusen
et al. (1995), Mercenier (1995a).
1Empirical research (from Bain 1956 to Sutton 1991) has abundantly demonstrated the ex-
istence of sunk costs and documented their various forms. The commitment value of sunk
costs has long fascinated industrial organization theorists, and models abound that show
why and how rents are derived from the incumbency advantage. All this work suggests that
the costless entry/exit assumption, though convenient, is an oversimpliﬂcation, which means
that current applied GE models are possibly missing important aspects of the competitive
game.
This paper shows, in particular, that the zero-sunk-costs restriction is responsible for
artiﬂcially large e–ciency gains from trade liberalization in these models. The reason follows
from Harris’ (1984) treatment of ﬂxed costs as being entirely recoverable. If fewer ﬂrms can
produce the same pre-liberalization level of output with fewer ﬂxed factors, then anything
that forces a ﬂrm out of the market liberates resources that become available to the rest of
the economy|hence producing potentially large e–ciency gains and, in some models, large
welfare gains. The introduction of sunk costs into applied GE models would temper these
gains in two important ways. First, because sunk investments are ﬂrm-speciﬂc, they will
actually not become available to other sectors when a ﬂrm exits. They are lost resources;
rationalization of production has no eﬁect on welfare. Second, a ﬂrm becomes committed to
a market by its irrecoverable expenditures. Since sunk factors have no opportunity value,
the ﬂrm will remain in the market as long as it earns positive rents from the sunk asset,
regardless of the market rate of return on recoverable assets. The irreversibility of sunk in-
vestment decisions, therefore, causes hysteresis in the economy’s industrial structure: ﬂrms
2that ﬂnd it proﬂtable to enter an industry because of a trade distortion may well ﬂnd it
proﬂtable to remain in the industry once the distortion is removed. In this case, sunk costs
act as an exit barrier. The industry rationalization mechanism does not operate, and the
predicted e–ciency and associated welfare gains will not materialize. Thus, Harris’ (1984)
strongly stated presumption that the introduction of noncompetitive market structure and
scale economies in applied GE models necessarily sharply increases the gains from trade lib-
eralization may actually not hold. The point is important to make since Harris’ presumption
is widely believed in both academic and policy circles: it has entered common wisdom.
The existence of sunk costs may also potentially aﬁect the nature of the oligopolistic
game once trade liberalization has been implemented. Indeed, with sunk costs, some collusion
among incumbents becomes consistent with no entry. Sunk costs also act as an entry barrier.
They make it more likely that, in order to recover some of the dissipated rents, producers
that have survived the policy change will tacitly agree to raise their prices. Even if transitory,
this eﬁect can only further mitigate the gains from trade liberalization. This argument was
used in the 1950s by Johnson (1957) in his discussion of the possible U.K. participation in
the European Economic Community. Surprisingly, the argument has been totally absent
from the quantitative evaluations of both NAFTA and the European Single Market.
This paper is a ﬂrst attempt at departing from the Chamberlinian assumption in an
applied GE model of trade and production. More speciﬂcally, we show how sunk costs may
be introduced into a numerical model, formulated as a two-stage game, that recognizes im-
perfect competition, increasing returns to scale, and product diﬁerentiation at the individual
3ﬂrm level. First, we modify the model previously used by Mercenier (1995a,b) to study Eu-
ropean integration issues. Then we show how the presence of sunk costs quantitatively and
qualitatively aﬁects the outcome of the trade liberalization exercise.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide a theoretical discussion of why
the usual modeling of ﬂxed costs is likely to overstate the gains from trade liberalization. In
section 3, we outline the applied GE model and the trade experiment. We discuss calibration
and computational issues in section 4 and simulation results in section 5. In section 6, we
conclude.
2. Motivation and Illustration
2.1. Sunk vs. Recoverable Fixed Costs
We ﬂrst highlight why industry rationalization can produce artiﬂcially large welfare
gains when ﬂxed costs are assumed recoverable. Throughout this section we use a two-sector
GE model borrowed from Markusen (1981) and Horstmann and Markusen (1986).
Consider a two-sector autarkic economy producing two consumption goods in the amounts
X and Y. There is a single production factor, competitively traded and in ﬂxed supply „ K.
Amount Y is competitively produced with KY units of capital; this good serves as nu-
meraire, and we choose the units so that Y = KY , which sets the rental price of capital to
one. Amount X is produced with KX by n identical Cournot-Nash ﬂrms facing increasing
returns to scale technologies. The cost structure of the individual ﬂrm is F + cx,w h e r eF
4represents a ﬂxed cost, c is a constant marginal cost, and x = X=n. Observe that, in this






where p is the unit price of output and †X is the elasticity of market demand for X. Entering
or exiting is costless for a ﬂrm, so n is determined by the zero-proﬂt condition. Households
have homothetic preferences U(X;Y) and maximize their utility subject to their budget
constraint. The economy’s resource constraint imposes that KX + KY • „ K.
We now undertake the thought experiment that this economy is integrated overnight
with a strictly identical economy producing the same goods. As is well known, even though
no trade actually occurs in this homogeneous goods case, each oligopolistic ﬂrm increases
its production simply because its perceived demand is more elastic in the integrated market
than in the autarkic equilibrium (Markusen 1981). Hence, p falls and negative proﬂts follow.
The output expansion eﬁect leads to exit of ﬂrms and to e–ciency gains.
Figure 1 illustrates the role of the ﬂxed cost in this process. There ABC is the production
possibility frontier (PPF) in autarky, and the slope of BC is the ratio of marginal costs c
(signed). Here AB is equal to the total ﬂxed cost (nF) necessary to start the production of
X with n ﬂrms. It represents both the opportunity cost of the ﬂxed resources in terms of Y
and the number of units of capital that must be used in industry X before production can
start. With E as the autarkic equilibrium, the slope of AE is equal (in absolute value) to the
average cost [since ACx = Kx=X =( A¡Y) =X] and thus to p. The diﬁerence between p and
5c depends on n and †X. After integration, the equilibrium (without trade) is at F, and the
movement from E to F can be decomposed in two steps: EG represents the output expansion
eﬁect of integration for a given number n of ﬂrms, and GF captures the rationalization eﬁect
via the exit of ﬂrms. Economic integration shifts the PPF to AB0C0 because the exit of ﬂrms
saves the recoverable resources devoted to the ﬂxed part of their cost. This shift is behind
Harris’ (1984) large welfare gains from trade liberalization.
[Insert here Figure 1: Trade Liberalization Without Sunk Cost]
Observe that this process depends critically on the mobility of the entire capital stock.
Assume, now, that F is entirely sunk: the ex ante mobile factor becomes ﬂrm-speciﬂc as
soon as it meets the ﬂxed component. In Figure 1, AB now represents the amount of capital
which, given n ﬂrms, has been sunk in autarky. The autarkic and integrated equilibria
must then be on the same PPF, that is, along ABC. Clearly, the welfare gains from trade
liberalization are potentially much smaller here than when F is recoverable.
This analysis assumes that the entire ﬂxed component of costs is sunk, which is clearly
unrealistic. We will now show that trade liberalization may not save any ﬂxed resources
even if the sunk share of ﬂxed costs is small.
2.2. Sunk Costs as Exit Barriers
To establish the role of sunk costs as barriers to exit, we make the simplifying assumption
that the sunk share 0 <s<1 of ﬂxed costs is exogenous to the ﬂrm. We thus avoid all
6strategic considerations most often associated with irrecoverable investments and disregard
speciﬂc sources of irreversibility as documented in the industrial organization literature.
We do this without too much apology: we want to establish the potential importance of
irreversibility by using a generic formulation which is tractable in a large-scale applied GE
model.2
Consider the entry decision of a ﬂrm conditional on entering an industry with n ¡ 1
other ﬂrms. Because the expected bankruptcy rate is assumed constant, the cost of acquiring
one unit of sunk capital is proportional to that of recoverable assets. We further simplify
the exposition by setting the risk premium to zero.3 The ﬂrm’s entry decision is based on
the condition that
px ‚ cx+ F; (2)
where all variables are evaluated at their postentry equilibrium values. While operating, the
ﬂrm has to pay its mobile factors at market prices. Rewards to the sunk assets are therefore
determined residually in the amount (p ¡ c)x ¡ (1 ¡ s)F. Because sunk capital has zero
2 More sophisticated models of irreversibility can, of course, be found in the literature. For instance,
Dixit (1980) shows how investments and capacity can be used to deter entry. Bagwell (1990) underlines
the role of imperfect information in preventing entry when product quality matters. Farrell and Shapiro
(1990) consider the role of advertising and other speciﬂc assets. See Gilbert (1989) for an early survey of this
literature. Each of these models captures important features of some industries. However, all imperfectly
competitive sectors may not ﬂt in any one of these speciﬂc frameworks, as required for numerical tractability.
Furthermore, the attractiveness of most of these models stems from their explicit treatment of intertemporal
trade-oﬁs, which one can hardly pretend to mimic in a static model. For these reasons, we do not allow
ﬂrms to manipulate their incumbency advantage. It should be mentioned that a few attempts have recently
been made to explicitly model irreversibility in international trade: Motta (1992) and Schmitt (1993) in
models of horizontal and vertical diﬁerentiation, respectively, with explicit choice of product attributes and
Horstmann and Markusen (1987) on multinationals.
3 As is immediate to check, the assumption is innocuous. It only avoids the trouble of rescaling some
variables.
7opportunity returns, the ﬂrm’s optimal behavior is to remain in the market as long as those
rents are positive; the exit condition is now
px • cx+( 1¡s ) F: (3)
Comparing (2) and (3) shows why sunk costs act as an exit barrier: by sunk investment
decisions, ﬂrms commit themselves to stay in the market|and signal to potential entrants
that they will do so|despite possible below-market-level returns for their speciﬂc assets.
Figure 2 illustrates how this market commitment aﬁects the e–ciency gains that result
from our trade integration experiment. The PPF in autarky is now composed of three parts.
Segments AB and BC represent, respectively, the economy’s sunk (nsF) and recoverable
[n(1 ¡ s)F] ﬂxed resources; the absolute value of the slope of segment CD is the marginal
cost c (signed).
[Insert here Figure 2: Trade Liberalization With Sunk Cost]
An autarkic equilibrium is shown at E, where p>A C x>csince the average cost of
an existing ﬂrm (in terms of mobile factors) is given by the slope of BE. No entry occurs
since the entrant’s average cost including the sunk cost (the slope of AE) is just equal to p.
The diﬁerences among price, average cost, and marginal cost depend now not only on the
demand elasticity and the number of ﬂrms, but also on the level of the sunk investment.
Here, as is true without sunk costs, integration induces ﬂrms to expand production
and, hence, lower equilibrium prices. In Figure 2, a new equilibrium is shown at point G.
Although the markup has fallen, p0 >A C 0
xis given by the slope of BG, and no exit occurs.
8The cost of the mobile factors is covered, and the owners of the sunk asset have no incentive
to pull out since a smaller rent is preferred to no rent at all.
Clearly, the ﬂxed costs do not need to be entirely sunk for trade liberalization to have
no rationalization eﬁect whatsoever. Indeed, if economic integration is not strong enough to
prevent incumbents from earning some positive returns on their sunk assets, the rational-
ization mechanism will not operate. There will be neither e–ciency nor welfare gains from
rationalization.
2.3. Sunk Costs as Entry Barriers
As a comparison between equations (2) and (3) makes clear, a sunk expenditure also
qualiﬂes as a barrier to entry since it is a cost \which must be borne by a ﬂrm which seeks
to enter an industry but is not borne by ﬂrms already in the industry" (Stigler 1968, p.
67). This shield against potential entrants will, in general, provide some scope for collusion
among incumbents in the aftermath of a trade liberalization.
To see why, consider the proﬂt-maximizing condition for a ﬂrm. The pricing equation





9where ` is an index of collusion which was initially set to zero. This index can vary between
` = 0 (Cournot) and ` = n ¡ 1 (perfect collusion).4 Since an incumbent ﬂrm’s behavior
in￿uences an entrant’s expected proﬂt, the entry condition becomes
p(`)x ‚ cx + F; (5)
where again all variables are evaluated at their postentry equilibrium values. We have
written p as a function of ` in order to stress the fact that, consistently with the symmetry
assumption, the potential entrant is assumed to collude as well. Since a potential ﬂrm was
at best expecting zero ex ante proﬂt in the initial equilibrium and since trade liberalization
has squeezed the operating proﬂts of incumbents, the liberalization has a fortiori made entry
unattractive; that is,
p(`)x<c x+F; ` =0 ; (6)
where all variables are evaluated at the post-liberalization, postentry equilibrium values
with ` = 0. Clearly, some price increases are consistent with no entry. The incentive
exists because collusion improves the returns on speciﬂc factors. In this sense, economic
integration has created a scope for collusion among existing ﬂrms of which sunk costs are an
indirect cause. The extent of tacit collusion determines the output expansion eﬁect through
p0. Therefore, in Figure 2, the equilibrium, once existing ﬂrms have taken advantage of this
scope for collusion, must be to the left of G along ACD.5
4 See Brander and Spencer (1985) for a similar formulation. Although ` is interpreted here as the degree
of collusion, it is known as a conjectural variation. Recent advances in industrial organization (Dockner
1992, Lapham and Ware 1994) have established a mapping between the static conjectural variation and
ﬂrms’ behavior in dynamic games. These results imply that the scope for collusion among existing ﬂrms can
indeed be viewed as the outcome of speciﬂc dynamic noncooperative games between ﬂrms.
5 The exact location of the equilibrium will, of course, depend on the elasticity of the ﬂrm’s revenue with
respect to `, n, and p.
10Collusion (tacit or explicit) may not last long. It may, nevertheless, be an important
factor in shaping the economy in the aftermath of a trade liberalization. Merger waves,
for instance, have often followed trade liberalization; these may be interpreted as attempts
by factor owners to recoup lower returns on their speciﬂc factors by changing the compet-
itive behavior within a subset of ﬂrms. Several recent models in the literature have indeed
conﬂrmed, using a repeated game framework, that economic integration may enhance tacit
collusion.6 Modeling the process of collusion in a large-scale applied GE model is, how-
ever, presently beyond our reach because of computational di–culties. We, therefore, limit
ourselves in our empirical investigation to the much more modest objective of providing an
estimate of the scope for collusion and of the GE eﬁects that would result if ﬂrms were to
take full advantage of this scope.
The model of this section assumed homogeneous goods. This assumption is convenient
because no trade actually results from trade integration. Yet trade integration causes an out-
put expansion, and this expansion triggers the industry rationalization mechanism. Clearly,
nothing in this chain mechanism depends on the homogeneity of goods. Indeed, Markusen
(1981) and Horstmann and Markusen (1986) have shown that the output expansion still
occurs when, as in our applied GE model, products are treated as imperfect substitutes,
markets have diﬁerent sizes, and the initial equilibrium involves nonprohibitive barriers to
trade.
6 See Davidson (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1989), and Fung (1992). Fung (1992) shows, among other
things, that the collusive outcome gets more likely when economic integration brings the cost of the foreign
and the domestic ﬂrms closer together.
113. The General Equilibrium Framework and Numerical Experiments
3.1. An Overview of the Model
We follow Sutton (1991) and assume that the new ﬂrm faces an indivisible setup (or
transaction) cost upon entering, that is, net of any resale value: it constitutes an irrecoverable
part of ﬂxed costs. Its level plays no role in the producer’s day-to-day pricing policy; sunk
costs aﬁect prices only indirectly by their in￿uence on entry/exit decisions. The individual
industry setting is a two-stage game. In stage 1, potential entrants choose whether or not
to enter; in stage 2, ﬂrms compete in the output market. The payoﬁ is either zero, if the
ﬂrm decides not to enter, or the proﬂts expected to be earned at stage 2 less the sunk cost
incurred at stage 1, if it decides to step in.
The second stage of the individual industry game is embedded in a general equilibrium,
so that, though exogenous to the ﬂrm, the sunk costs are endogenous to the economy as
a whole. The industry equilibrium is speciﬂed as stationary subgame-perfect. In that very
speciﬂc sense, the static GE model can be interpreted as the steady state of a dynamic
model. Note that the nature of the game and our assumption of an indivisible setup cost
require that the number of ﬂrms be treated as an integer in the general equilibrium.
The GE setup has been extensively discussed by Mercenier (1995a,b). To conserve on
space, we here give only an overview of its main features and refer to those papers for a more
formal presentation.
12The world economy consists of six regions: Great Britain (GB), Germany (G), France
(Fr), Italy (It), the rest of the European Economic Community (RE), and the rest of the world
(ROW). All regions are fully endogenous and have the same structure. Each region has nine
sectors of production, of which ﬂve are imperfectly competitive; see Table 1. The treatment
of the competitive side of the model is quite standard. (See, for example, Srinivasan and
Whalley 1986.) Regions are linked by an Armington system (in which goods are diﬁerentiated
in demand by their geographic origin). In the oligopolistic sectors, ﬂrms|both existing
and potential entrants|are assumed to be symmetric (they have the same technology and
market shares) within national boundaries. Firms operate with ﬂxed primary factor costs
and, therefore, face increasing returns to scale in production. They have no monopsony
power in any market for inputs, primary or intermediate.
[Insert here Table 1: Sectoral Disaggregation and Industry Characteristics]
Each individual oligopolist produces one diﬁerentiated good. The game between non-
competitive ﬂrms is Nash in sales. The instantaneous GE concept adopted is a compromise
in terms of informational requirements between the primitive conjectural-Cournot-Nash-
Walras equilibrium of Negishi (1961) and the objective-Cournot-Nash-Walras equilibrium
introduced by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972). Namely, here noncompetitive ﬂrms know the
preferences and technologies of their clients, which they use in maximizing proﬂts. Firms
are, however, assumed to neglect the feedback eﬁect of their decisions on their proﬂts via
13income (the Ford eﬁect) and input-output multipliers [the Nikaido (1975) eﬁect].7
Final demand decisions are made in each region by a representative utility-maximizing
agent. A detailed region- and sector-speciﬂc system of price-responsive intermediate demands
is speciﬂed. All components of demand|ﬂnal as well as intermediate|recognize diﬁerences
in products from individual oligopolistic ﬂrms, ￿ a la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier
(1982). Both preferences and technologies, therefore, have increasing returns to the number
of varieties, so that product diversity aﬁects not only household utility but also production
e–ciency in all sectors, competitive and noncompetitive. Production factors move freely
across sectors, and capital is assumed internationally mobile as long as it has not been used
to meet speciﬂc investments. National economies within Europe are initially assumed seg-
mented in the sense that each ﬂrm treats the national markets as separate entities for which
separate output decisions can be made; see, for example, Brander (1981). Market segmen-
tation is caused by nontariﬁ barriers|such as norms, government procurement policies, and
security regulations|which prevent consumers from cross-border arbitraging. These non-
tariﬁ barriers are treated as latent variables underlying the pre-reform price system, which
is calibrated to be consistent with optimal output decisions by individual oligopolists.
3.2. European Trade Integration
The performed experiment portrays the move to a single market in Europe, as ﬂrst
7 This partial equilibrium compromise obviously simpliﬂes the computations. It has also been advocated
in the theoretical literature (Hart 1985, p. 121) in order to avoid nonexistence problems highlighted by
Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977).
14formalized by Smith and Venables (1988). It consists of forcing the individual ﬂrms to switch
from a separate output decision for each market to a single output decision within Europe,
where markups are determined from average EEC-wide monopoly power. The interpretation
is that cross-border arbitraging is restored by the removal of all forms of nontariﬁ barriers.
Note that the experiment is similar to the one we did above, in the theoretical analysis.
Formally, the noncompetitive ﬂrm’s markup equation in European markets (neglecting









;j 2 EEC: (7)
Here, pij (piEEC) and zij (ziEEC) denote, respectively, the price and the volume of sales of
country i’s representative ﬂrm in national market j (in the EEC-wide market), and vi is its
marginal cost. The control parameter ‚ is binary: the model is calibrated with ‚ =1 ,a n d
market integration is implemented by setting ‚ =0 .
3.3. Post-Reform Equilibrium With Collusion
To provide a quantitative assessment of the potential costs of increased tacit collusion
induced by economic integration, we modify the post-reform, within-EEC output strategy






;i 2 EEC: (8)
We start from the post-trade-liberalization Nash-Cournot equilibrium (`s = 0) and compute
the largest value of the tacit-collusion indices consistent with no entry in any industry. That
15is, we calculate the largest value such that at the new equilibrium, if in any industry a
ﬂrm were to consider entering the EEC market, its operating proﬂts would not cover the
setup costs. In so doing, we remain consistent with our assumption of symmetry of domestic
ﬂrms|actual and potential|in an industry and assume that the entrant joins incumbents
in the tacit-collusion arrangement when evaluating its potential proﬂts. In view of this
simpliﬂcation, our numerical experiment should be understood as providing an upper bound
to the true scope for collusion.
4. Calibration and Computational Considerations
4.1. The Calibration of the Nonsunk Component of Costs
The calibration of the optimal markups does not depend on whether or not ﬂrms have
sunk costs, so we do not dwell on this; see Mercenier (1995a). By that calibration we
determine the initial price system pij and the variable unit costs ci; average prices are
normalized to one.
When ﬂrms have no sunk costs, they earn no rents (or supranormal proﬂts) in equilib-
rium, and the diﬁerence between average and marginal costs unambiguously determines the
ﬂxed unit costs. Technologies have to be assumed region-speciﬂc in this case. When entry
barriers exist, ﬂrms can earn positive oligopoly rents on their speciﬂc assets. Since data
on base-year supranormal proﬂts are unavailable or unreliable, we have to make some addi-
tional assumptions on the technology. We assume that, except for small diﬁerences in the
16way they combine variable inputs, ﬂrms have access to the same technology independently of
their production location.8 They, therefore, face essentially the same amount of ﬂxed costs,
though they exploit unequally well economies of scale in the base year. In other words, if the
composition of variable costs did not diﬁer, all ﬂrms in an industry would be on the same
average cost curve. The average cost curve is, then, pinned down by the assumption that
the less e–cient ﬂrms experience zero proﬂts.9
We state this more formally. Assume that the representative ﬂrm of country j has the
smallest output xj. The scale elasticity at which it operates is 1/cj (where average prices





The more e–cient producers’ ﬂxed costs are, then, determined so that were they to operate






Thus, were ci = cj, ﬂrms i and j would have the same ﬂxed costs. It is then straightforward
to compute the scale elasticities that ﬂrms face at their actual output level xi ‚ xj,a sw e l l
as the oligopoly rents they earn in the base-year equilibrium. Table 2 reports the computed
8 Expenditure shares on variable inputs are provided by the data base and are, therefore, not identical
across countries within the same industry.
9 This somewhat arbitrary assumption is conservative. For reasons that should be clear from the previous
section, assuming positive rather than zero proﬂts for these ﬂrms in the base year would only strengthen our
argument.
17inverse base-year scale elasticities for the ﬂve imperfectly competitive sectors in our data
set.10
[Insert here Table 2: Calibrated Ratios of Marginal to Average Costs]
4.2. The Calibration of Sunk Costs
A general equilibrium with sunk costs supports nonzero supranormal proﬂts without
attracting entry. We determine the level of the setup costs to be the lowest possible consistent
with no entry in the base year, that is, such that the expected proﬂt of an entrant is zero in
the most e–cient country of production.
We do not expect, a priori, large diﬁerences in sunk costs across industrialized countries
within an industry. To assume that entry barriers are of equal size in Europe and in the rest
of the world proves unrealistic, however. This is because European ﬂrms typically operate
at a smaller scale than do their competitors in the United States and Japan. Producers in
the rest of the world, therefore, experience higher operating proﬂts, which would make this
region the most attractive location for new entrants. The size of the sunk costs necessary
to prevent this entry is unreasonably high compared to the average European ﬂrm’s size.
Therefore, we allow a European-speciﬂc sunk cost as small as possible consistent with the
same costs within an industry across all European countries and no entry.
10 Due to the lack of reliable data on the composition of ﬂxed costs, we assume that, in each region, ﬂxed
and total costs have the same share of capital and labor inputs.
18Table 3 reports the calibrated sunk costs as a percentage of the representative ﬂrm’s
value of production in the ﬂve oligopolistic sectors. Empirical estimates of sunk costs are
extremely scarce and, when available, refer to very disaggregated subindustries. Short of
direct comparisons, we oﬁer two remarks to put our estimates into perspective. First, the
results in Table 3 are about 10 times higher than those estimated by Sutton (1991, Table 4.3,
p. 106) for very speciﬂc sub-industries belonging to the food and beverages sector. Recall,
however, that in the model this sector is approximated as perfectly competitive because of
the very low concentration and economies of scale that prevail at our level of aggregation.
We should not be surprised, therefore, that in those sectors that are more oligopolistic than
is the food and beverages sector, our sunk cost estimates relative to sales are higher than
Sutton’s. Second, our estimates seem reasonable if we recognize that sunk costs in a given
industry are proportional to the minimum e–cient scale of production in that industry. (See
Sutton 1991 for a discussion on this point).11
[Insert here Table 3: Calibrated Sunk Costs as Percentage of Representative Firm’s Sales]
4.3. Computational Considerations
The computation of the subgame-perfect stationary two-stage equilibrium is made ex-
tremely complex by the integer nature of the entry/exit decision. Fortunately, interindustry
diﬁerences in concentration and ﬂrm size are essentially identical across regions, which makes
11 Pratten (1988) reports minimum e–cient scale (m.e.s.) for the food industries ranging from 0.2 percent
to 1.2 percent of the U.K. market (with a few outliers around 4-5 percent). He estimates the m.e.s. in the
chemical and the transportation industries as 20 percent and 100 percent of the U.K. market, respectively.
19the system almost recursive with respect to the number of ﬂrms. Recognizing this consid-
erably reduces the computational work.12 The numerical search is nevertheless extremely
tedious, excessively so to permit any serious numerical exploration of the possibility of mul-
tiple solutions. Therefore, nothing ensures that the equilibrium found is independent of the
search strategy adopted. Progress in nonlinear mixed-integer programming algorithms must
be made before such issues can be explored in large-scale highly nonlinear applied GE models
of this type.13
5. Results
In Table 4, we compare the trade integration results generated with the traditional
costless-entry, zero-proﬂt equilibrium concept to those obtained when acknowledging entry
barriers in the form of sunk costs; in both cases, the output game is Nash. All results
are percentage deviations from initial equilibrium. To conserve on space, we report only
the three variables most relevant to our discussion: welfare, the number of ﬂrms, and the
e–ciency gains measured as the real cost savings due to increased scale of production.14
[Insert here Table 4: Eﬁects of European Trade Integration Without Collusion]
12 This is our strategy: Sort industries by decreasing concentration. Determine the smallest integer number
of ﬂrms in the most concentrated sector consistent with nonnegative proﬂts and no entry while holding
constant industry structure elsewhere. Proceed in the same way for the next most concentrated industry;
then check that the equilibrium number of ﬂrms previously computed is still consistent with nonnegative
proﬂts and no entry. If not, move back and adjust; otherwise, proceed forward to the next industry.
13 Mercenier (1995b) suggests that costless entry/exit of ﬂrms is a potentially important cause of multi-
plicity in applied GE with increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. His conjecture suggests
that nonuniqueness is less likely to be a problem in the present model.
14 In order to reduce the numerical burden, we treat the number of ﬂrms as a real rather than an integer
variable when computing the costless-entry, zero-proﬂt equilibrium. This assumption is clearly conservative:
it can only bias downward the importance of the industry rationalization mechanism in the costless exit case.
20As is clear in section a of the table, without sunk costs, trade liberalization results in
unambiguous e–ciency gains. Industry rationalization ￿ a la Harris (1984) is seen here to
operate as a powerful mechanism. It is particularly apparent in the o–ce machinery sector,
which provides a textbook illustration: Trade barriers within the EEC are responsible for
the existence of an excessive number of small ine–cient ﬂrms in all regions; across regions,
the opening up of trade forces from 5 to 15 percent of the producers out of the market, hence
letting the survivors increase their output and move down along their average cost curves.
There is, however, no reason why prices should go down uniformly across regions within an
industry: the restructuring of demand may actually increase the market size of some regions’
producers at the expense of some others. This is what we observe, for instance, in the motor
vehicles sector where, in some regions, the average ﬂrm size increases, generating e–ciency
gains despite new entries occurring. Clearly, costless entry/exit of ﬂrms is key in initiating
this e–ciency-improving reallocation of production factors across regions and industries.
Sunk costs, by specializing some factors and by altering the nature of the game, make
the rationalization gains more unlikely. Section b of Table 4 demonstrates this. Protected
from potential competitors by entry barriers, all but the least e–cient producers earn positive
rents: the policy-induced contraction of price-cost margins is too small in most regions and
industries to induce exit.15 The industry structure thus remains essentially unaﬁected by
15 Exit actually only occurs where rents were arbitrarily assumed null in the initial equilibrium; an as-
sumption of positive proﬂts for the least e–cient producers might have resulted in no exit at all.
21trade liberalization. The small e–ciency gains that result are, in all but very few cases,
exclusively due to the price-induced expansion of demand.16
We have shown that the presence of sunk costs fundamentally aﬁects the trade policy
outcome because the industry rationalization mechanism is inoperant with sunk costs. Yet,
surprisingly, the welfare gains seem here quite robust to these diﬁerences. The reason behind
this is plain, however. Consumers and producers|both noncompetitive and competitive|
value product diversity ￿ a la Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier. The e–ciency gains that result from ratio-
nalization without sunk costs are, with this particular parameterization, oﬁset by the cost
of having fewer products made available to ﬂnal and intermediate demands. Clearly, this
need not be true in other diﬁerently parameterized models where industry rationalization
does generate welfare gains.
[Insert here Table 5: Eﬁects of European Trade Integration with Tacit Price Collusion]
Are we right to assume that the output game remains unaﬁected by the trade reform?
Or should we rather consider the possibility that, in Johnson’s (1957, p. 271) words, \division
of markets by trade barriers ... may simply be replaced by international cartelization having
the same eﬁect"? The results in Table 5 suggest that in some industries, ﬂrms have indeed
signiﬂcant incentives to collude in order to recover some of their pre-reform rents. As one
expects, the scope for collusion is highest in the most concentrated industries: motor vehicles
16 Aggregate EEC output unambiguously increases in all noncompetitive sectors although substitution
eﬁects may result in some producers gaining and others losing market shares. Note that this, together with
changes in variable unit costs, is su–cient to attract some entry in the German nonpharmaceutical chemical
industry: as one expects, the sunk costs are small in this sector as a result of low industry concentration.
22and o–ce machinery. In these sectors, EEC producers could collectively raise their prices by
some 16 and 28 percent, respectively, without attracting entry. In the other three noncom-
petitive sectors, the large number of competitors present in the market (indirectly, through
lower levels of sunk costs) prevent existing ﬂrms from entering into a collusive arrangement
of serious importance. Overall, however, the general equilibrium eﬁects prove su–cient to
oﬁset most of the e–ciency and welfare gains expected from the trade reform: the initial
segmentation of the EEC market by nontariﬁ barriers is replaced by inter-European tacit
collusion having almost the same eﬁect. The outcome could actually become much worse
if products were slightly more diﬁerentiated than is assumed in the base scenario, as the
sensitivity analysis reported in Table 6 indicates. Though the welfare gains prove reason-
ably robust when European ﬂrms do not collude, the gains turn unambiguously into losses
when European ﬂrms collude in a world with slightly more diﬁerentiated products. Then,
ironically, the only ones to beneﬂt from the completion of the European Single Market are
consumers in the rest of the world.
[Insert here Table 6: Welfare Gains { Sensitivity Analysis]
6. Conclusions
A major conclusion of recent research in industrial organization is that the structure of
noncompetitive industries is largely conditioned by the existence of sunk costs. Yet, so far,
the literature on applied imperfectly competitive GE models has not modeled these costs.
Here we have shown how a generic formulation of sunk costs can be introduced into a static
23large-scale model of trade and production calibrated on real-world data. The GE concept
adopted is consistent with free entry and exit of ﬂrms as well as pure proﬂts (or rents on
speciﬂc assets). It encompasses the traditional Chamberlinian zero-proﬂt equilibrium as a
special case, where sunk costs are null.
We have shown that adopting the broader GE concept has important implications for
the evaluation of trade liberalization policies. One is that Harris’ (1984) treatment of ﬂxed
costs as entirely recoverable is likely to generate artiﬂcially large e–ciency gains, and in
some models large welfare gains, from industry rationalization. Another implication of the
introduction of sunk costs is that, protected against potential competition by entry barriers,
incumbent ﬂrms have an incentive to collude to recover some of their forgone rents. This can
only further mitigate the gains to be expected from trade liberalization. Our main conclusion
is clear. When a model includes sunk costs, Harris’ presumption that incorporating imper-
fect competition and scale economies necessarily sharply increases gains from freer trade
appears ill-founded and possibly misleading. Since this presumption is so strongly stated
and widely believed in the literature, we think that our point is important. Admittedly, our
formalization of both sunk costs and collusion is rather crude. A more satisfactory treat-
ment of irreversibility would require an explicit modeling of agents’ intertemporal decision
making, presumably under uncertainty. Also, the modeling of collusion must address the
free-rider incentive of the participants in order to determine how long such an arrangement
might be sustainable. Game-theoretic dynamic extensions are called for here. The aim of
24this ﬂrst attempt to incorporate sunk costs in a large-scale applied GE model should, there-
fore, be seen as providing quantitative evidence that more theoretical and empirical research
on the industrial organization eﬁects of trade policy is needed. The recent work by Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) suggests that progress in that direction is possible|indeed, promising.
Though our discussion has focused on trade policy issues, the implications are evidently
much more general.
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GB 0.934 0.864 0.872 0.955 0.917
G 0.917 0.920 0.910 0.962 0.953
Fr 0.796 0.799 0.904 0.932 0.956
It 0.811 0.827 0.886 0.971 0.926
RE 0.906 0.837 0.807 0.887 0.856
ROW 0.958 0.950 0.981 0.964 0.963








GB 0.153 0.241 0.244 0.230 0.208
G 0.195 0.133 0.164 0.190 0.114
Fr 0.544 0.386 0.177 0.353 0.106
It 0.501 0.320 0.213 0.146 0.184
RE 0.224 0.299 0.396 0.486 0.384
ROW 0.167 0.159 0.193 0.077 0.111